TypesusedinTLS/DTLSsocket() = gen_tcp:socket()
sslsocket() = any()
An opaque reference to the TLS/DTLS connection, may be used for equality matching.
tls_option() = tls_client_option() | tls_server_option()
tls_client_option() =
client_option() |
common_option() |
socket_option() |
transport_option()
tls_server_option() =
server_option() |
common_option() |
socket_option() |
transport_option()
socket_option() =
gen_tcp:connect_option() |
gen_tcp:listen_option() |
gen_udp:option()
The default socket options are [{mode,list},{packet,0},{header,0},{active,true}].
For valid options, see the inet(3erl), gen_tcp(3erl) and gen_udp(3erl) manual pages in Kernel.
Note that stream oriented options such as packet are only relevant for TLS and not DTLS
active_msgs() =
{ssl, sslsocket(), Data :: binary() | list()} |
{ssl_closed, sslsocket()} |
{ssl_error, sslsocket(), Reason :: any()} |
{ssl_passive, sslsocket()}
When a TLS/DTLS socket is in active mode (the default), data from the socket is delivered to the
owner of the socket in the form of messages as described above.
The ssl_passive message is sent only when the socket is in {active,N} mode and the counter
dropped to 0. It indicates that the socket has transitioned to passive ({active,false}) mode.
transport_option() =
{cb_info,
{CallbackModule :: atom(),
DataTag :: atom(),
ClosedTag :: atom(),
ErrTag :: atom()}} |
{cb_info,
{CallbackModule :: atom(),
DataTag :: atom(),
ClosedTag :: atom(),
ErrTag :: atom(),
PassiveTag :: atom()}}
Defaults to {gen_tcp,tcp,tcp_closed,tcp_error,tcp_passive} for TLS (for backward compatibility
a four tuple will be converted to a five tuple with the last element "second_element"_passive) and
{gen_udp,udp,udp_closed,udp_error} for DTLS (might also be changed to five tuple in the
future). Can be used to customize the transport layer. The tag values should be the values used by
the underlying transport in its active mode messages. For TLS the callback module must implement a
reliable transport protocol, behave as gen_tcp, and have functions corresponding to
inet:setopts/2, inet:getopts/2, inet:peername/1, inet:sockname/1, and inet:port/1. The callback
gen_tcp is treated specially and calls inet directly. For DTLS this feature must be considered
exprimental.
host() = hostname() | ip_address()
hostname() = string()
ip_address() = inet:ip_address()
protocol_version() = tls_version() | dtls_version()
tls_version() = 'tlsv1.2' | 'tlsv1.3' | tls_legacy_version()
dtls_version() = 'dtlsv1.2' | dtls_legacy_version()
tls_legacy_version() = tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1'
dtls_legacy_version() = dtlsv1
prf_random() = client_random | server_random
verify_type() = verify_none | verify_peer
ciphers() = [erl_cipher_suite()] | string()
erl_cipher_suite() =
#{key_exchange := kex_algo(),
cipher := cipher(),
mac := hash() | aead,
prf := hash() | default_prf}
cipher() =
aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm |
aes_128_ccm | aes_256_ccm | aes_128_ccm_8 | aes_256_ccm_8 |
chacha20_poly1305 |
legacy_cipher()
legacy_cipher() = rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc'
cipher_filters() =
[{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, algo_filter()}]
hash() = sha | sha2() | legacy_hash()
sha2() = sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512
legacy_hash() = md5
old_cipher_suite() =
{kex_algo(), cipher(), hash()} |
{kex_algo(), cipher(), hash() | aead, hash()}
sign_algo() = rsa | dsa | ecdsa | eddsa
sign_scheme() =
eddsa_ed25519 | eddsa_ed448 | ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 |
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 | ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 |
rsassa_pss_scheme() |
sign_scheme_legacy()
rsassa_pss_scheme() =
rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 | rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 |
rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 | rsa_pss_pss_sha256 |
rsa_pss_pss_sha384 | rsa_pss_pss_sha512
sign_scheme_legacy() =
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 | rsa_pkcs1_sha384 | rsa_pkcs1_sha512 |
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 | ecdsa_sha1
group() =
secp256r1 | secp384r1 | secp521r1 | ffdhe2048 | ffdhe3072 |
ffdhe4096 | ffdhe6144 | ffdhe8192
kex_algo() =
rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa | ecdh_ecdsa |
ecdh_rsa | srp_rsa | srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk |
dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon | any
algo_filter() =
fun((kex_algo() | cipher() | hash() | aead | default_prf) ->
true | false)
named_curve() =
sect571r1 | sect571k1 | secp521r1 | brainpoolP512r1 |
sect409k1 | sect409r1 | brainpoolP384r1 | secp384r1 |
sect283k1 | sect283r1 | brainpoolP256r1 | secp256k1 |
secp256r1 | sect239k1 | sect233k1 | sect233r1 | secp224k1 |
secp224r1 | sect193r1 | sect193r2 | secp192k1 | secp192r1 |
sect163k1 | sect163r1 | sect163r2 | secp160k1 | secp160r1 |
secp160r2
psk_identity() = string()
srp_identity() = {Username :: string(), Password :: string()}
srp_param_type() =
srp_1024 | srp_1536 | srp_2048 | srp_3072 | srp_4096 |
srp_6144 | srp_8192
app_level_protocol() = binary()
protocol_extensions() =
#{renegotiation_info => binary(),
signature_algs => signature_algs(),
alpn => app_level_protocol(),
srp => binary(),
next_protocol => app_level_protocol(),
max_frag_enum => 1..4,
ec_point_formats => [0..2],
elliptic_curves => [public_key:oid()],
sni => hostname()}
error_alert() =
{tls_alert, {tls_alert(), Description :: string()}}
tls_alert() =
close_notify | unexpected_message | bad_record_mac |
record_overflow | handshake_failure | bad_certificate |
unsupported_certificate | certificate_revoked |
certificate_expired | certificate_unknown |
illegal_parameter | unknown_ca | access_denied |
decode_error | decrypt_error | export_restriction |
protocol_version | insufficient_security | internal_error |
inappropriate_fallback | user_canceled | no_renegotiation |
unsupported_extension | certificate_unobtainable |
unrecognized_name | bad_certificate_status_response |
bad_certificate_hash_value | unknown_psk_identity |
no_application_protocol
reason() = any()
bloom_filter_window_size() = integer()
bloom_filter_hash_functions() = integer()
bloom_filter_bits() = integer()
client_session_tickets() = disabled | manual | auto
server_session_tickets() = disabled | stateful | stateless
TLS/DTLSOPTIONDESCRIPTIONS-COMMONforSERVERandCLIENTcommon_option() =
{protocol, protocol()} |
{handshake, handshake_completion()} |
{cert, cert() | [cert()]} |
{certfile, cert_pem()} |
{key, key()} |
{keyfile, key_pem()} |
{password, key_password()} |
{ciphers, cipher_suites()} |
{eccs, [named_curve()]} |
{signature_algs, signature_algs()} |
{signature_algs_cert, sign_schemes()} |
{supported_groups, supported_groups()} |
{secure_renegotiate, secure_renegotiation()} |
{keep_secrets, keep_secrets()} |
{depth, allowed_cert_chain_length()} |
{verify_fun, custom_verify()} |
{crl_check, crl_check()} |
{crl_cache, crl_cache_opts()} |
{max_handshake_size, handshake_size()} |
{partial_chain, root_fun()} |
{versions, protocol_versions()} |
{user_lookup_fun, custom_user_lookup()} |
{log_level, logging_level()} |
{log_alert, log_alert()} |
{hibernate_after, hibernate_after()} |
{padding_check, padding_check()} |
{beast_mitigation, beast_mitigation()} |
{ssl_imp, ssl_imp()} |
{session_tickets, session_tickets()} |
{key_update_at, key_update_at()} |
{middlebox_comp_mode, middlebox_comp_mode()}
protocol() = tls | dtls
Choose TLS or DTLS protocol for the transport layer security. Defaults to tls. For DTLS other
transports than UDP are not yet supported.
handshake_completion() = hello | full
Defaults to full. If hello is specified the handshake will pause after the hello message and give
the user a possibility make decisions based on hello extensions before continuing or aborting the
handshake by calling handshake_continue/3 or handshake_cancel/1
cert() = public_key:der_encoded()
The DER-encoded users certificate. Note that the cert option may also be a list of DER-encoded
certificates where the first one is the users certificate and the rest of the certificates
constitutes the certificate chain. For maximum interoperability the certificates in the chain
should be in the correct order, the chain will be sent as is to the peer. If chain certificates
are not provided, certificates from client_cacerts(), server_cacerts(), or client_cafile(),
server_cafile() are used to construct the chain. If this option is supplied, it overrides option
certfile.
cert_pem() = file:filename()
Path to a file containing the user certificate on PEM format or possible several certificates
where the first one is the users certificate and the rest of the certificates constitutes the
certificate chain. For more details see cert(),
key() =
{'RSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' |
'PrivateKeyInfo',
public_key:der_encoded()} |
#{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa,
engine := crypto:engine_ref(),
key_id := crypto:key_id(),
password => crypto:password()}
The DER-encoded user's private key or a map refering to a crypto engine and its key reference that
optionally can be password protected, seealso crypto:engine_load/4 and Crypto's Users Guide. If
this option is supplied, it overrides option keyfile.
key_pem() = file:filename()
Path to the file containing the user's private PEM-encoded key. As PEM-files can contain several
entries, this option defaults to the same file as given by option certfile.
key_password() = string()
String containing the user's password. Only used if the private keyfile is password-protected.
cipher_suites() = ciphers()
A list of cipher suites that should be supported
The function ssl:cipher_suites/2 can be used to find all cipher suites that are supported by
default and all cipher suites that may be configured.
If you compose your own cipher_suites() make sure they are filtered for cryptolib support
ssl:filter_cipher_suites/2 Additionaly the functions ssl:append_cipher_suites/2 ,
ssl:prepend_cipher_suites/2, ssl:suite_to_str/1, ssl:str_to_suite/1, and
ssl:suite_to_openssl_str/1 also exist to help creating customized cipher suite lists.
Note:
Note that TLS-1.3 and TLS-1.2 cipher suites are not overlapping sets of cipher suites so to
support both these versions cipher suites from both versions need to be included. Also if the
supplied list does not comply with the configured versions or cryptolib so that the list becomes
empty, this option will fallback on its appropriate default value for the configured versions.
Non-default cipher suites including anonymous cipher suites (PRE TLS-1.3) are supported for
interop/testing purposes and may be used by adding them to your cipher suite list. Note that they
must also be supported/enabled by the peer to actually be used.
signature_algs() = [{hash(), sign_algo()} | sign_scheme()]
Explicitly list acceptable signature algorithms for certificates and handshake messages in the
preferred order. The client will send its list as the client hello signature_algorithm extension
introduced in TLS-1.2, see Section 7.4.1.4.1 in RFC 5246. Previously these algorithms where
implicitly chosen and partly derived from the cipher suite.
In TLS-1.2 a somewhat more explicit negotiation is made possible using a list of {hash(),
sign_algo()} pairs.
In TLS-1.3 these algorithm pairs are replaced by so called signature schemes sign_scheme() and
completely decoupled from the cipher suite.
Signature algorithms used for certificates may be overridden by the signature schemes (algorithms)
supplied by the signature_algs_cert option.
TLS-1.2 default is
Default_TLS_12_Alg_Pairs=
[
%% SHA2
{sha512, ecdsa},
{sha512, rsa},
{sha384, ecdsa},
{sha384, rsa},
{sha256, ecdsa},
{sha256, rsa},
{sha224, ecdsa},
{sha224, rsa},
%% SHA
{sha, ecdsa},
{sha, rsa},
{sha, dsa}
]
Support for {md5, rsa} was removed from the the TLS-1.2 default in ssl-8.0 (OTP-22)
TLS_13_Legacy_Schemes=
[
%% Legacy algorithms only applicable to certificate signatures
rsa_pkcs1_sha512, %% Corresponds to {sha512, rsa}
rsa_pkcs1_sha384, %% Corresponds to {sha384, rsa}
rsa_pkcs1_sha256, %% Corresponds to {sha256, rsa}
ecdsa_sha1, %% Corresponds to {sha, ecdsa}
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 %% Corresponds to {sha, rsa}
]
Default_TLS_13_Schemes=
[
%% ECDSA
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
%% RSASSA-PSS
rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
%% EDDSA
eddsa_ed25519,
eddsa_ed448]
TLS-1.3 default is
Default_TLS_13_Schemes ++ Legacy_TLS_13_Schemes
If both TLS-1.3 and TLS-1.2 are supported the default will be
Default_TLS_13_Schemes ++ Default_TLS_12_Alg_Pairs
so appropriate algorithms can be chosen for the negotiated version.
Note:
TLS-1.2 algorithms will not be negotiated for TLS-1.3, but TLS-1.3 RSASSA-PSS rsassa_pss_scheme()
signature schemes may be negotiated also for TLS-1.2 from 24.1 (fully working from 24.1.3).
However if TLS-1.3 is negotiated when both TLS-1.3 and TLS-1.2 is supported using defaults, the
corresponding TLS-1.2 algorithms to the TLS-1.3 legacy signature schemes will be considered as the
legacy schemes and applied only to certificate signatures.
sign_schemes() = [sign_scheme()]
Explicitly list acceptable signature schemes (algorithms), in prefered ordered, for certificates,
overrides the algorithms supplied in signature_algs option for certificates.
In addition to the signature_algorithms extension from TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 (RFC 5246 Section 4.2.3)
adds the signature_algorithms_cert extension which enables having special requirements on the
signatures used in the certificates that differs from the requirements on digital signatures as a
whole. If this is not required this extension is not need.
The client will send a signature_algorithms_cert extension (in the client hello message), if TLS
version 1.2 (back-ported to TLS 1.2 in 24.1) or later is used, and the signature_algs_cert option
is explicitly specified. By default, only the signature_algs extension is sent.
Note:
Note that supported signature schemes for TLS-1.2 are sign_scheme_legacy() and rsassa_pss_scheme()
supported_groups() = [group()]
TLS 1.3 introduces the "supported_groups" extension that is used for negotiating the Diffie-
Hellman parameters in a TLS 1.3 handshake. Both client and server can specify a list of parameters
that they are willing to use.
If it is not specified it will use a default list ([x25519, x448, secp256r1, secp384r1]) that is
filtered based on the installed crypto library version.
secure_renegotiation() = boolean()
Specifies if to reject renegotiation attempt that does not live up to RFC 5746. By default
secure_renegotiate is set to true, that is, secure renegotiation is enforced. If set to false
secure renegotiation will still be used if possible, but it falls back to insecure renegotiation
if the peer does not support RFC 5746.
allowed_cert_chain_length() = integer()
Maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that can follow the peer certificate
in a valid certification path. So, if depth is 0 the PEER must be signed by the trusted ROOT-CA
directly; if 1 the path can be PEER, CA, ROOT-CA; if 2 the path can be PEER, CA, CA, ROOT-CA, and
so on. The default value is 10.
custom_verify() =
{Verifyfun :: function(), InitialUserState :: any()}
The verification fun is to be defined as follows:
fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() |
{revoked, atom()}} |
{extension, #'Extension'{}} | valid | valid_peer, InitialUserState :: term()) ->
{valid, UserState :: term()} |
{fail, Reason :: term()} | {unknown, UserState :: term()}.
The verification fun is called during the X509-path validation when an error or an extension
unknown to the SSL application is encountered. It is also called when a certificate is considered
valid by the path validation to allow access to each certificate in the path to the user
application. It differentiates between the peer certificate and the CA certificates by using
valid_peer or valid as second argument to the verification fun. See the public_key User's Guide
for definition of #'OTPCertificate'{} and #'Extension'{}.
* If the verify callback fun returns {fail,Reason}, the verification process is immediately
stopped, an alert is sent to the peer, and the TLS/DTLS handshake terminates.
* If the verify callback fun returns {valid,UserState}, the verification process continues.
* If the verify callback fun always returns {valid,UserState}, the TLS/DTLS handshake does not
terminate regarding verification failures and the connection is established.
* If called with an extension unknown to the user application, return value {unknown,UserState}
is to be used.
Note that if the fun returns unknown for an extension marked as critical, validation will
fail.
Default option verify_fun in verify_peermode:
{fun(_,{bad_cert, _} = Reason, _) ->
{fail, Reason};
(_,{extension, _}, UserState) ->
{unknown, UserState};
(_, valid, UserState) ->
{valid, UserState};
(_, valid_peer, UserState) ->
{valid, UserState}
end, []}
Default option verify_fun in mode verify_none:
{fun(_,{bad_cert, _}, UserState) ->
{valid, UserState};
(_,{extension, #'Extension'{critical = true}}, UserState) ->
{valid, UserState};
(_,{extension, _}, UserState) ->
{unknown, UserState};
(_, valid, UserState) ->
{valid, UserState};
(_, valid_peer, UserState) ->
{valid, UserState}
end, []}
The possible path validation errors are given on form {bad_cert,Reason} where Reason is:
unknown_ca:
No trusted CA was found in the trusted store. The trusted CA is normally a so called ROOT CA,
which is a self-signed certificate. Trust can be claimed for an intermediate CA (trusted
anchor does not have to be self-signed according to X-509) by using option partial_chain.
selfsigned_peer:
The chain consisted only of one self-signed certificate.
PKIXX-509-pathvalidationerror:
For possible reasons, see public_key:pkix_path_validation/3
crl_check() = boolean() | peer | best_effort
Perform CRL (Certificate Revocation List) verification (public_key:pkix_crls_validate/3) on all
the certificates during the path validation (public_key:pkix_path_validation/3) of the
certificate chain. Defaults to false.
peer:
check is only performed on the peer certificate.
best_effort:
if certificate revocation status cannot be determined it will be accepted as valid.
The CA certificates specified for the connection will be used to construct the certificate chain
validating the CRLs.
The CRLs will be fetched from a local or external cache. See ssl_crl_cache_api(3erl).
crl_cache_opts() =
{Module :: atom(),
{DbHandle :: internal | term(), Args :: list()}}
Specify how to perform lookup and caching of certificate revocation lists. Module defaults to
ssl_crl_cache with DbHandle being internal and an empty argument list.
There are two implementations available:
ssl_crl_cache:
This module maintains a cache of CRLs. CRLs can be added to the cache using the function
ssl_crl_cache:insert/1, and optionally automatically fetched through HTTP if the following
argument is specified:
{http,timeout()}:
Enables fetching of CRLs specified as http URIs inX509 certificate extensions. Requires the
OTP inets application.
ssl_crl_hash_dir:
This module makes use of a directory where CRLs are stored in files named by the hash of the
issuer name.
The file names consist of eight hexadecimal digits followed by .rN, where N is an integer,
e.g. 1a2b3c4d.r0. For the first version of the CRL, N starts at zero, and for each new
version, N is incremented by one. The OpenSSL utility c_rehash creates symlinks according to
this pattern.
For a given hash value, this module finds all consecutive .r* files starting from zero, and
those files taken together make up the revocation list. CRL files whose nextUpdate fields are
in the past, or that are issued by a different CA that happens to have the same name hash, are
excluded.
The following argument is required:
{dir,string()}:
Specifies the directory in which the CRLs can be found.
root_fun() = function()
fun(Chain::[public_key:der_encoded()]) ->
{trusted_ca, DerCert::public_key:der_encoded()} | unknown_ca}
Claim an intermediate CA in the chain as trusted. TLS then performs
public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 with the selected CA as trusted anchor and the rest of the
chain.
protocol_versions() = [protocol_version()]
TLS protocol versions supported by started clients and servers. This option overrides the
application environment option protocol_version and dtls_protocol_version. If the environment
option is not set, it defaults to all versions, supported by the SSL application. See also ssl(7).
custom_user_lookup() =
{Lookupfun :: function(), UserState :: any()}
The lookup fun is to defined as follows:
fun(psk, PSKIdentity :: binary(), UserState :: term()) ->
{ok, SharedSecret :: binary()} | error;
fun(srp, Username :: binary(), UserState :: term()) ->
{ok, {SRPParams :: srp_param_type(), Salt :: binary(),
DerivedKey :: binary()}} | error.
For Pre-Shared Key (PSK) cipher suites, the lookup fun is called by the client and server to
determine the shared secret. When called by the client, PSKIdentity is set to the hint presented
by the server or to undefined. When called by the server, PSKIdentity is the identity presented by
the client.
For Secure Remote Password (SRP), the fun is only used by the server to obtain parameters that it
uses to generate its session keys. DerivedKey is to be derived according to RFC 2945 and RFC
5054: crypto:sha([Salt,crypto:sha([Username,<<$:>>,Password])])session_id() = binary()
Identifies a TLS session.
log_alert() = boolean()
If set to false, TLS/DTLS Alert reports are not displayed. Deprecated in OTP 22, use {log_level,
logging_level()} instead.
logging_level() = logger:level() | none | all
Specifies the log level for a TLS/DTLS connection. Alerts are logged on notice level, which is the
default level. The level debug triggers verbose logging of TLS/DTLS protocol messages. See also
ssl(7)
hibernate_after() = timeout()
When an integer-value is specified, TLS/DTLS-connection goes into hibernation after the specified
number of milliseconds of inactivity, thus reducing its memory footprint. When undefined is
specified (this is the default), the process never goes into hibernation.
handshake_size() = integer()
Integer (24 bits unsigned). Used to limit the size of valid TLS handshake packets to avoid DoS
attacks. Defaults to 256*1024.
padding_check() = boolean()
Affects TLS-1.0 connections only. If set to false, it disables the block cipher padding check to
be able to interoperate with legacy software.
Warning:
Using {padding_check,boolean()} makes TLS vulnerable to the Poodle attack.
beast_mitigation() = one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled
Affects TLS-1.0 connections only. Used to change the BEAST mitigation strategy to interoperate
with legacy software. Defaults to one_n_minus_one.
one_n_minus_one - Perform 1/n-1 BEAST mitigation.
zero_n - Perform 0/n BEAST mitigation.
disabled - Disable BEAST mitigation.
Warning:
Using {beast_mitigation,disabled} makes TLS-1.0 vulnerable to the BEAST attack.
ssl_imp() = new | old
Deprecated since OTP-17, has no effect.
session_tickets() =
client_session_tickets() | server_session_tickets()
Configures the session ticket functionalty in TLS 1.3 client and server.
key_update_at() = integer() >= 1
Configures the maximum amount of bytes that can be sent on a TLS 1.3 connection before an
automatic key update is performed.
There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can be safely encrypted under a
given set of keys. The current default ensures that data integrity will not be breached with
probability greater than 1/2^57. For more information see Limits on Authenticated Encryption Use
in TLS.
Warning:
The default value of this option shall provide the above mentioned security guarantees and it
shall be reasonable for most applications (~353 TB).
middlebox_comp_mode() = boolean()
Configures the middlebox compatibility mode on a TLS 1.3 connection.
A significant number of middleboxes misbehave when a TLS 1.3 connection is negotiated.
Implementations can increase the chance of making connections through those middleboxes by making
the TLS 1.3 handshake more like a TLS 1.2 handshake.
The middlebox compatibility mode is enabled (true) by default.
keep_secrets() = boolean()
Configures a TLS 1.3 connection for keylogging
In order to retrieve keylog information on a TLS 1.3 connection, it must be configured in advance
to keep the client_random and various handshake secrets.
The keep_secrets functionality is disabled (false) by default.
Added in OTP 23.2
TLS/DTLSOPTIONDESCRIPTIONS-CLIENTclient_option() =
{verify, client_verify_type()} |
{reuse_session, client_reuse_session()} |
{reuse_sessions, client_reuse_sessions()} |
{cacerts, client_cacerts()} |
{cacertfile, client_cafile()} |
{alpn_advertised_protocols, client_alpn()} |
{client_preferred_next_protocols,
client_preferred_next_protocols()} |
{psk_identity, client_psk_identity()} |
{srp_identity, client_srp_identity()} |
{server_name_indication, sni()} |
{max_fragment_length, max_fragment_length()} |
{customize_hostname_check, customize_hostname_check()} |
{fallback, fallback()} |
{session_tickets, client_session_tickets()} |
{use_ticket, use_ticket()} |
{early_data, client_early_data()}
client_verify_type() = verify_type()
In mode verify_none the default behavior is to allow all x509-path validation errors. See also
option verify_fun.
client_reuse_session() =
session_id() | {session_id(), SessionData :: binary()}
Reuses a specific session. The session should be refered by its session id if it is earlier saved
with the option {reuse_sessions,save} since OTP-21.3 or explicitly specified by its session id
and associated data since OTP-22.3. See also SSL's Users Guide, Session Reuse pre TLS 1.3
client_reuse_sessions() = boolean() | save
When save is specified a new connection will be negotiated and saved for later reuse. The session
ID can be fetched with connection_information/2 and used with the client option reuse_session The
boolean value true specifies that if possible, automatized session reuse will be performed. If a
new session is created, and is unique in regard to previous stored sessions, it will be saved for
possible later reuse. Since OTP-21.3
client_cacerts() = [public_key:der_encoded()]
The DER-encoded trusted certificates. If this option is supplied it overrides option cacertfile.
client_cafile() = file:filename()
Path to a file containing PEM-encoded CA certificates. The CA certificates are used during server
authentication and when building the client certificate chain.
client_alpn() = [app_level_protocol()]
The list of protocols supported by the client to be sent to the server to be used for an
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN). If the server supports ALPN then it will choose a
protocol from this list; otherwise it will fail the connection with a "no_application_protocol"
alert. A server that does not support ALPN will ignore this value.
The list of protocols must not contain an empty binary.
The negotiated protocol can be retrieved using the negotiated_protocol/1 function.
client_preferred_next_protocols() =
{Precedence :: server | client,
ClientPrefs :: [app_level_protocol()]} |
{Precedence :: server | client,
ClientPrefs :: [app_level_protocol()],
Default :: app_level_protocol()}
Indicates that the client is to try to perform Next Protocol Negotiation.
If precedence is server, the negotiated protocol is the first protocol to be shown on the server
advertised list, which is also on the client preference list.
If precedence is client, the negotiated protocol is the first protocol to be shown on the client
preference list, which is also on the server advertised list.
If the client does not support any of the server advertised protocols or the server does not
advertise any protocols, the client falls back to the first protocol in its list or to the default
protocol (if a default is supplied). If the server does not support Next Protocol Negotiation, the
connection terminates if no default protocol is supplied.
max_fragment_length() = undefined | 512 | 1024 | 2048 | 4096
Specifies the maximum fragment length the client is prepared to accept from the server. See RFC
6066
client_psk_identity() = psk_identity()
Specifies the identity the client presents to the server. The matching secret is found by calling
user_lookup_funclient_srp_identity() = srp_identity()
Specifies the username and password to use to authenticate to the server.
sni() = hostname() | disable
Specify the hostname to be used in TLS Server Name Indication extension. If not specified it will
default to the Host argument of connect/[3,4] unless it is of type inet:ipaddress().
The HostName will also be used in the hostname verification of the peer certificate using
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2.
The special value disable prevents the Server Name Indication extension from being sent and
disables the hostname verification check public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2
customize_hostname_check() = list()
Customizes the hostname verification of the peer certificate, as different protocols that use TLS
such as HTTP or LDAP may want to do it differently, for possible options see
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3
fallback() = boolean()
Send special cipher suite TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to avoid undesired TLS version downgrade. Defaults to
false
Warning:
Note this option is not needed in normal TLS usage and should not be used to implement new
clients. But legacy clients that retries connections in the following manner
ssl:connect(Host,Port,[...{versions,['tlsv2','tlsv1.1','tlsv1']}])ssl:connect(Host,Port,[...{versions,[tlsv1.1','tlsv1']},{fallback,true}])ssl:connect(Host,Port,[...{versions,['tlsv1']},{fallback,true}])
may use it to avoid undesired TLS version downgrade. Note that TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV must also be
supported by the server for the prevention to work.
client_session_tickets() = disabled | manual | auto
Configures the session ticket functionality. Allowed values are disabled, manual and auto. If it
is set to manual the client will send the ticket information to user process in a 3-tuple:
{ssl,session_ticket,{SNI,TicketData}}
where SNI is the ServerNameIndication and TicketData is the extended ticket data that can be used
in subsequent session resumptions.
If it is set to auto, the client automatically handles received tickets and tries to use them when
making new TLS connections (session resumption with pre-shared keys).
Note:
This option is supported by TLS 1.3 and above. See also SSL's Users Guide, Session Tickets and
Session Resumption in TLS 1.3
use_ticket() = [binary()]
Configures the session tickets to be used for session resumption. It is a mandatory option in
manual mode (session_tickets=manual).
Note:
Session tickets are only sent to user if option session_tickets is set to manual
This option is supported by TLS 1.3 and above. See also SSL's Users Guide, Session Tickets and
Session Resumption in TLS 1.3
client_early_data() = binary()
Configures the early data to be sent by the client.
In order to be able to verify that the server has the intention to process the early data, the
following 3-tuple is sent to the user process:
{ssl,SslSocket,{early_data,Result}}
where Result is either accepted or rejected.
Warning:
It is the responsibility of the user to handle a rejected Early Data and to resend when it is
appropriate.
TLS/DTLSOPTIONDESCRIPTIONS-SERVERserver_option() =
{cacerts, server_cacerts()} |
{cacertfile, server_cafile()} |
{dh, dh_der()} |
{dhfile, dh_file()} |
{verify, server_verify_type()} |
{fail_if_no_peer_cert, fail_if_no_peer_cert()} |
{reuse_sessions, server_reuse_sessions()} |
{reuse_session, server_reuse_session()} |
{alpn_preferred_protocols, server_alpn()} |
{next_protocols_advertised, server_next_protocol()} |
{psk_identity, server_psk_identity()} |
{sni_hosts, sni_hosts()} |
{sni_fun, sni_fun()} |
{honor_cipher_order, honor_cipher_order()} |
{honor_ecc_order, honor_ecc_order()} |
{client_renegotiation, client_renegotiation()} |
{session_tickets, server_session_tickets()} |
{anti_replay, anti_replay()} |
{cookie, cookie()} |
{early_data, server_early_data()}
server_cacerts() = [public_key:der_encoded()]
The DER-encoded trusted certificates. If this option is supplied it overrides option cacertfile.
server_cafile() = file:filename()
Path to a file containing PEM-encoded CA certificates. The CA certificates are used to build the
server certificate chain and for client authentication. The CAs are also used in the list of
acceptable client CAs passed to the client when a certificate is requested. Can be omitted if
there is no need to verify the client and if there are no intermediate CAs for the server
certificate.
dh_der() = binary()
The DER-encoded Diffie-Hellman parameters. If specified, it overrides option dhfile.
Warning:
The dh_der option is not supported by TLS 1.3. Use the supported_groups option instead.
dh_file() = file:filename()
Path to a file containing PEM-encoded Diffie Hellman parameters to be used by the server if a
cipher suite using Diffie Hellman key exchange is negotiated. If not specified, default parameters
are used.
Warning:
The dh_file option is not supported by TLS 1.3. Use the supported_groups option instead.
server_verify_type() = verify_type()
A server only does x509-path validation in mode verify_peer, as it then sends a certificate
request to the client (this message is not sent if the verify option is verify_none). You can then
also want to specify option fail_if_no_peer_cert.
fail_if_no_peer_cert() = boolean()
Used together with {verify,verify_peer} by an TLS/DTLS server. If set to true, the server fails
if the client does not have a certificate to send, that is, sends an empty certificate. If set to
false, it fails only if the client sends an invalid certificate (an empty certificate is
considered valid). Defaults to false.
server_reuse_sessions() = boolean()
The boolean value true specifies that the server will agree to reuse sessions. Setting it to false
will result in an empty session table, that is no sessions will be reused. See also option
reuse_session
server_reuse_session() = function()
Enables the TLS/DTLS server to have a local policy for deciding if a session is to be reused or
not. Meaningful only if reuse_sessions is set to true. SuggestedSessionId is a binary(), PeerCert
is a DER-encoded certificate, Compression is an enumeration integer, and CipherSuite is of type
ciphersuite().
server_alpn() = [app_level_protocol()]
Indicates the server will try to perform Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN).
The list of protocols is in order of preference. The protocol negotiated will be the first in the
list that matches one of the protocols advertised by the client. If no protocol matches, the
server will fail the connection with a "no_application_protocol" alert.
The negotiated protocol can be retrieved using the negotiated_protocol/1 function.
server_next_protocol() = [app_level_protocol()]
List of protocols to send to the client if the client indicates that it supports the Next Protocol
extension. The client can select a protocol that is not on this list. The list of protocols must
not contain an empty binary. If the server negotiates a Next Protocol, it can be accessed using
the negotiated_next_protocol/1 method.
server_psk_identity() = psk_identity()
Specifies the server identity hint, which the server presents to the client.
honor_cipher_order() = boolean()
If set to true, use the server preference for cipher selection. If set to false (the default), use
the client preference.
sni_hosts() =
[{hostname(), [server_option() | common_option()]}]
If the server receives a SNI (Server Name Indication) from the client matching a host listed in
the sni_hosts option, the specific options for that host will override previously specified
options. The option sni_fun, and sni_hosts are mutually exclusive.
sni_fun() = function()
If the server receives a SNI (Server Name Indication) from the client, the given function will be
called to retrieve [server_option()] for the indicated server. These options will be merged into
predefined [server_option()] list. The function should be defined as: fun(ServerName :: string())
-> [server_option()] and can be specified as a fun or as named funmodule:function/1 The option
sni_fun, and sni_hosts are mutually exclusive.
client_renegotiation() = boolean()
In protocols that support client-initiated renegotiation, the cost of resources of such an
operation is higher for the server than the client. This can act as a vector for denial of service
attacks. The SSL application already takes measures to counter-act such attempts, but client-
initiated renegotiation can be strictly disabled by setting this option to false. The default
value is true. Note that disabling renegotiation can result in long-lived connections becoming
unusable due to limits on the number of messages the underlying cipher suite can encipher.
honor_cipher_order() = boolean()
If true, use the server's preference for cipher selection. If false (the default), use the
client's preference.
honor_ecc_order() = boolean()
If true, use the server's preference for ECC curve selection. If false (the default), use the
client's preference.
server_session_tickets() = disabled | stateful | stateless
Configures the session ticket functionality. Allowed values are disabled, stateful and stateless.
If it is set to stateful or stateless, session resumption with pre-shared keys is enabled and the
server will send stateful or stateless session tickets to the client after successful connections.
A stateful session ticket is a database reference to internal state information. A stateless
session ticket is a self-encrypted binary that contains both cryptographic keying material and
state data.
Note:
This option is supported by TLS 1.3 and above. See also SSL's Users Guide, Session Tickets and
Session Resumption in TLS 1.3
anti_replay() =
'10k' | '100k' |
{bloom_filter_window_size(),
bloom_filter_hash_functions(),
bloom_filter_bits()}
Configures the server's built-in anti replay feature based on Bloom filters.
Allowed values are the pre-defined '10k', '100k' or a custom 3-tuple that defines the properties
of the bloom filters: {WindowSize,HashFunctions,Bits}. WindowSize is the number of seconds after
the current Bloom filter is rotated and also the window size used for freshness checks.
HashFunctions is the number hash functions and Bits is the number of bits in the bit vector. '10k'
and '100k' are simple defaults with the following properties:
* '10k': Bloom filters can hold 10000 elements with 3% probability of false positives.
WindowSize: 10, HashFunctions: 5, Bits: 72985 (8.91 KiB).
* '100k': Bloom filters can hold 100000 elements with 3% probability of false positives.
WindowSize: 10, HashFunctions: 5, Bits: 729845 (89.09 KiB).
Note:
This option is supported by TLS 1.3 and above and only with stateless session tickets. Ticket
lifetime, the number of tickets sent by the server and the maximum number of tickets stored by the
server in stateful mode are configured by application variables. See also SSL's Users Guide,
Anti-Replay Protection in TLS 1.3
cookie() = boolean()
If true (default), the server sends a cookie extension in its HelloRetryRequest messages.
Note:
The cookie extension has two main purposes. It allows the server to force the client to
demonstrate reachability at their apparent network address (thus providing a measure of DoS
protection). This is primarily useful for non-connection-oriented transports. It also allows to
offload the server's state to the client. The cookie extension is enabled by default as it is a
mandatory extension in RFC8446.
server_early_data() = disabled | enabled
Configures if the server accepts (enabled) or rejects (rejects) early data sent by a client. The
default value is disabled.
Warning:
This option is a placeholder, early data is not yet implemented on the server side.
connection_info() =
[common_info() |
curve_info() |
ssl_options_info() |
security_info()]
common_info() =
{protocol, protocol_version()} |
{session_id, session_id()} |
{session_resumption, boolean()} |
{selected_cipher_suite, erl_cipher_suite()} |
{sni_hostname, term()} |
{srp_username, term()}
curve_info() = {ecc, {named_curve, term()}}
ssl_options_info() = tls_option()
security_info() =
{client_random, binary()} |
{server_random, binary()} |
{master_secret, binary()}
connection_info_items() = [connection_info_item()]
connection_info_item() =
protocol | session_id | session_resumption |
selected_cipher_suite | sni_hostname | srp_username | ecc |
client_random | server_random | master_secret | keylog |
tls_options_name()
tls_options_name() = atom()
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